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Introduction
The Iranian foreign policy could be analyzed through different perspectives and case stud-
ies. In fact, many academic attempts have been made to refer the Iranian foreign policy 
to existing international relation theories. Iranian nuclear program is one of those cases 
that could draw additional light into the complexity of Iranian foreign policy behavior and 
there are several reasons for this assessment. First of all, it has remained as an important 
diplomatic topic on the international agenda that lasted since the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. Second, it particularly exposed Iranian foreign policy decision-makers to their west-
ern counterparts in the last decade. Third, like no other topic, it draws a light into different, 
some have stated, conflicting foreign policy perceptions of existing Iranian establishment. 
Three last Iranian presidents have been involved in this case in different political and 
regional circumstances and different negotiating frameworks with the international com-
munity. These circumstances and their opposing views and actions have also provided 
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an important analytical ground to reveal tendencies in Iranian diplomacy. Mohammad 
Khatami is regarded as the Iran’s first reformist president who based his diplomatic efforts 
on dialogue with the international community. His cabinet has attempted to find a compro-
mising solution with the troika of the European Union at the time of Iraqi crisis with an 
aim to build confidence with the West and to promote Iranian openness. Additional goal 
was to prevent bringing Iran’s nuclear case to the UN Security Council while strong US 
military presence was increasing in the neighborhood. While dialogue, compromise and 
confidence building reflected new foreign policy style, the latter goal reflected rather true 
national interest of his country. To add some complexity, his policies of openness led to 
repeated clashes with the conservative Islamists from the Iranian establishment. This may 
have reflected double track approach of the latter.
 At the beginning of his first presidential term Mahmoud Ahmadinejad changed 
immediately this reformist course and made it sound more populist and nationalistic. In 
the meantime, political and security considerations in the region have changed to favor 
Iranian position. As evidence suggested, official Tehran had other national interests to 
pursue. In a speech to students in Mashhad, Ahmedinejad was quoted as saying that Iran’s 
conditions had changed completely as it had become a nuclear state and could talk to other 
states from that stand. In the meantime, new multilateral negotiating framework has been 
designed as the US government decided to step in. 
 Circumstances and expectations have changed once again at the end of his pres-
idency. The evidence has suggested that economic sanctions were becoming unbearable 
and political isolation was increasing in Iran in 2011-2013. This might have caused yet 
another shift in Iranian foreign policy approach. New Iranian president, a relative moder-
ate cleric, has been the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) for 16 
years. Hasan Rouhani has been involved as close associate of the supreme leader Khame-
nei and key nuclear negotiator of his reformist predecessor. In this regard, he looked like 
trustworthy option for change. Rouhani also promised to promote greater openness of the 
Islamic Republic. He went as far as talking to president Obama directly over the phone, 
the diplomatic move that was unbelievable in the past. As time has repeated itself, Rou-
hani has also run into fierce resistance from hard-liners who were opposing his pragmatic 
ideas.  
 It is important to note that the office of the president is not directly responsible 
for the nuclear negotiation. It is instead set by the Supreme National Security Council 
(SNSC). SNSC includes two representatives appointed by the Iranian supreme leader Ali 
Khamenei, military officials, and other executive, judicial, and legislative representatives. 
In this regard, Ali Khamenei has been playing a critical role in direction of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
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 Several examples of his political moves were very illustrative. Khamenei broke 
all illusion of the West by stating that Iran is not Soviet Union and that Khatami is not 
Gorbacov (Hefner, 2005). This has also been evident during the tumultuous 2009 presi-
dential elections, the outcome of which was determined by Khamenei’s decisive support 
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The third striking example is when Khamenei en-
dorsed Rouhani and allowed his administration to have direct contacts with American 
administration on the very top. 
A Survey of Iranian Nuclear Issue
It has been the Iranian monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi who initiated the national nuclear pro-
gram in 1960s. Evidence has suggested that governments of the United States supported 
Iranian nuclear program from the very beginning and Israel from 1977. The Tehran Nucle-
ar Research Center, supplied by the United States, opened in 1967. It was equipped with 
5-megawatt nuclear research reactor called the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), fueled by 
highly enriched uranium. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 
and the Parliament ratified it in February 1970. The process of Uranium enrichment was 
allowed under this treaty. Few years later, the president Ford was quoted as expressing his 
support in principle for the shah’s plan to develop a full-fledged nuclear power program 
to diversify Iran’s energy sources. 
 The Iranian involvement in the nuclear program did not bring any special diplo-
matic or security consideration in 1960s or 1970s, neither by the United States nor by Isra-
el. The Iranian revolution, however, brought different perceptions of the Program in 1979. 
Due to the regime change, nuclear dossier of Iran has also changed and became important 
security issue. Golamreza Jusefi, former Iranian ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
has talked about American shift from fully fledged support to isolation of his country in an 
interview for the local Bosnian press in February 12, 2012. Germany has also withdrawn 
from building six nuclear reactors, two of them in Busher in 1979. It signed this agree-
ment with Iranian authorities in 1976.
 Imam Khomeini wrote that Iranians must stand on their own feet after war with 
Iraq (Baqer, 2009.) Iran was particularly vulnerable to chemical weapons used by Iraqi 
forces. Some foreign dignitaries understood Khomeini’s statement as a call to develop 
non-conventional weapons. Opponents of this argument are often quoting Khomeini’s 
fatwa by which he disapproved building nuclear weapons in his country. Since February 
2003, Iran’s program for constructing the complete cycle for producing enriched Uranium 
has been the subject of intense international debates. Authorities from Tehran strongly 
advocated that it was their international right to pursue civil nuclear energy, not for any 
kind of the military purposes. The last three Iranian presidents have been involved in this 
issue during tense negotiation with the international community, particularly the Europe-
an Union and the US government. 
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 The United States suspected that Iran might divert from civil to military compo-
nent and produce nuclear weapons. European governments were concerned that Iran’s 
nuclear program could set off a spiral of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and final-
ly kill off the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Leonard, 2005). Israel in particular and other re-
gional countries in general feared that Iranian nuclear case will change existing balance of 
power in Iranian favor and bring about new nuclear proliferation. In fact, Iran and Western 
countries have made various diplomatic up-s and down-s over possible deal, from easing 
the tension and reaching the point of compromise from one side to international isolation, 
sanction and war games to the other, never crossing the red line on either side. At the latest 
stage of the negotiations Iran held its first bilateral talks in decades with the United States 
in a major step towards concluding a comprehensive nuclear deal with the West. Several 
discussion rounds at the level of foreign ministers took place in Geneva and Wien in 2014, 
the latest in November this year. 
Phase of Iranian Foreign Policy
 As reflected through Iranian nuclear dossier in the last 11 years, three different 
phases could be distinguished in Iranian foreign policy behavior. The first phase was 
linked with the second mandate of Khatami presidency with particular attention to the 
period of 2003 - 2005. At that specific time, we have witnessed serious and open dialogue 
and near compromise with EU troika on the diplomatic surface. The second phase was 
the period of nuclear populism and nationalism of Ahmedinejad in both of his presidential 
mandates (2005-2009 and 2009-2013). This also included unsuccessful negotiations with 
the Security Council (plus Germany) that ended with fourth round of international sanc-
tions and toughest isolation of the Islamic Republic of Iran ever. Finally, the third phase 
came with the election of reformist president Rouhani in 2013. This phase reset Iranian 
foreign policy and increased hope in diplomatic solution.  
Towards Dialogue and Double Track Approach
Iranian authorities and the European Union Troika have intensively tried to find common 
ground over Iranian nuclear program from 2003 – 2005 with each side pursuing its own 
foreign policy agenda. Former Iranian president Khatami advanced the policy of dialogue 
and mutual agreement with the international community. According to Thaler, Nader and 
Chubin (2010) his reformist camp believed that stabilization policy of decreased confron-
tation would secure achievements of Islamic revolution. Iran is a signer of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which president Khatami said ensures that member nations have 
the right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. His administration managed to skillfully 
handle the nuclear dossier by negotiating compromise with European powers.
 Under Khatami’s presidency, Iran signed the Sa’d Abaad agreement with the Eu-
ropean troika in 2003. According to this agreement, “the Iranian authorities reaffirmed 
that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine and that its nuclear program 
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and activities have been exclusively in the peaceful domain.” The Iranian Government 
has also decided “to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve 
through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues.” Following this path, 
Iran suspended its Uranium enrichment program under the new agreement with the EU 
troika in November 2004. Negotiating team of president Khatami also agreed to sign the 
Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The Additional Protocol granted IAEA inspectors 
greater authority in their nuclear verification programs. 
 All these agreements and unilateral acts reflected reformist approach in the Iranian 
foreign policy. Their main elements included opening and integration of Iran in the inter-
national community. Other foreign policy objectives may be more pragmatic from the se-
curity point. Local sources have suggested that Iranian establishment did not want to bring 
nuclear case at the UN Security Council while US troops were stationed in Iraq. Former 
spokesperson of Iran’s nuclear negotiation team (2003-2005), Seyed Hossein Mousavian 
argued that this was the major success and skillful diplomatic maneuver missed by Khata-
mi successor. “While Mohammad Khatami was president, Mousavian notes, Iran was not 
referred to the UN Security Council and did not face the array of draconian sanctions that 
are dragging down its economy today.” 
 Khatami phase also reflected double track approach of Iranian foreign policy. 
While temporary suspension of Uranium enrichment as a confidence-building gesture 
was formally accepted and practically applied from the end of 2004 through 2005, the 
Iranian Parliament never ratified the Additional Protocol. President Khatami has indicated 
in his communication with the EU that Iranian authorities will preserve the enrichment 
freeze. Similar and reconciliatory diplomatic messages have been stated by his key nucle-
ar negotiator and future president Hassan Rouhani. However, as reported by local media 
in Tehran, other authorities were sending mixed signals in the election years of 2004 
(parliamentary) and 2005 (presidential). This could only be understood as building up an 
alternative road.
 The Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei did not object that president Khatami 
has open dialogue with the EU troika. He neither stopped him from offering gestures 
of good will. However, he did not restrain from public criticism of Khatami throughout 
his mandate and endorsed opposition groups to be more critical of his moderate foreign 
policy. As Khatami mandate was approaching to an end, this role has been more evident 
and politically transparent. The Guardian Council disqualified 3533 moderate candidates 
out of 8145, among whom 80 were existing moderate MP-s, for parliamentary election in 
2004. Ali Khamenei who controlled the Guardian Council may have already decided to 
bring new leadership and produce policy change. Independent scholar Farideh Farhi also 
examined Iran’s nuclear policy and argued that the foundations for a nationalist nuclear 
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discourse were carefully laid out during the presidency of reformist Khatami. 
 It is understood that Iranian establishment and true decision makers calculated 
that it was not necessary to continue this path of compromise and opening as from 2005. 
Thus, the policy of dialogue has ended with the end of Khatami presidency. Hassan Rou-
hani also resigned as key nuclear negotiator. Time was ready for different foreign policy 
rhetoric. It seems that Ahmedinejad was perfect choice.  
Towards Diplomatic Tension   
The victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brought new political elite in the Iranian govern-
ment. It also brought new political discourse and new diplomatic agenda of confidence 
breaking. New president inaugurated nationalistic and populist rhetoric from the very 
beginning of his mandate. Ehteshami and Zweiri (2007) from the Institute of Middle East 
and Islamic Studies made detailed analysis of this political transformation by marking 
Ahmedinejad and his political cycle as neoconservative, principal, ideologically Islamic, 
revolution in character and non clerical.
 
 Even though Ahmadinejad reaffirmed his intention to put forward new proposals 
during his speech at the UN General Assembly in 2005, he recommended restarting Ura-
nium enrichment process at home. Actually, his first major policy was to reject the EU’s 
offer from 2005. Ahmedinejad also sacked 40 Iranian diplomats in a massive cleaning of 
the reformist oriented Foreign Service including those involved in the country’s nuclear 
negotiations with the European troika. Hassan Rouhani, the pragmatic chief negotiator, 
was replaced with Ali Larijani, who said that exchanging Iran’s nuclear program for trade 
concessions would be like trading “a pearl for a candy.” Leonard (2005) has marked new 
president’s initial phase as aggressive and toxic. Ahmedinejad’s diplomatic approach has 
been followed by specific action plan at home. Officials from Tehran broke open inter-
nationally monitored seals on the Natanz enrichment facility in the central Iran and at 
two related storage and testing locations. These activities cleared the way for Iranians 
to resume Uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel research what the US and EU countries 
objected and feared the most. 
 There were several possible reasons why this foreign policy change happened. It 
has been argued that the EU troika reacted slow and late to Khatami’s unilateral favor. 
They agreed to deliver a set of political, economic and nuclear offers only after presiden-
tial elections in 2005. It also remains a question how much Iranian leadership was willing 
to make a deal with the EU without the United States. Seyed Hossein Mousavian argued 
that the supreme leader had lost confidence in the ability of the Europeans to deliver on 
their promises by early 2005. Farideh Farhi argued that the failure of negotiations be-
tween the reformist government and European representatives and subsequent increased 
pressure on Ahmadinejad government contributed to the increasingly loud tone Iranian 
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negotiators took after 2006. 
 Iran felt more secured after constitutional changes and elections in Iraq favored 
their pro Iranian constituency. Peter Galbraith shared these views in his book from the 
same year “Iraq: Bush Islamic Republic.” To support this argument further, I will also 
quote Iranian ambassador to Bagdad as saying that it was big day for them as elected Iraqi 
people were our people that we supported. American casualties have been on increase at 
that time. Woodward (2008) suggested that Iran gave his contribution to this. By publish-
ing National Intelligence Estimate in 2007, the US administration gave up the military 
solution against Iran completely. Ahmedinejad celebrated this news by proclaiming the 
largest Iranian victory in last 100 years (David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, 
Jarrold D. Greem, Charlotte Lynch, F.Wehrey, 2010). 
 In the meantime, the US government got involved in this case along China and 
Russia. Iranian nuclear dossier has been moved into the new multilateral negotiating 
framework of five plus one (5 members of UN Security Council plus Germany). Through-
out Ahmedinedjad mandate, Iran and Western countries, however, remained far apart in 
these negotiations. As they continued without any compromise at reach, Bush administra-
tion lobbied for three rounds of sanctions by UNSC. President Obama offered dialogue 
but soon realized that diplomatic breakthrough with Ahmedinejad was not possible. He 
also lobbied for the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 imposing fourth round of mul-
tilateral sanctions in 2011. On every move in this regard, Ahmedinejad radicalized his 
rhetoric and announced further unilateral moves. He called these resolutions a piece of 
torn paper. Challenging expected fourth round of UN sanctions, he announced that Iran 
would increase Uranium enrichment process from 3% to 20% level for the first time. This 
move marked a major increase in Iranian nuclear capabilities in 2010 narrowing the space 
between civil and military level. 
 There was one important observation during this phase. According to IAEA report 
from August, 2012, Iran enriched 6876 kg of Uranium up to level of 3 % and 189 kg up 
to level of 20%. As noticed from all other IAEA reports, enriched uranium of 20% never 
crossed 200 kg. As soon as Iranian authorities would reach close to 200 kg, they would 
convert it into nonreturnable fuel recycle for civil purpose. This represented small but im-
portant sign of Iranian rationality not to provoke international intervention. The problem 
would have appeared if 20% enriched Uranium had piled up more than 200kg and eventu-
ally enriched to 90%. The latter enrichment level is considered by experts as the military 
level sufficient for one nuclear bomb. It seems that 200 kg was self-declared Iranian red 
line. It was also publicly declared red line by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu who stated 
this at different multilateral forums.   
     
 At the peak of this diplomatic crisis, the US and EU member states imposed multi-
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lateral and bilateral sanctions preventing Iran from trading its oil to the EU in 2012. Presi-
dent Ahmadinejad said the sanctions were a “used hand tissue that should be thrown in the 
dustbin,” and that they were “not capable of harming Iranians.” Iran threatened to close 
Hormuz passage and entered war games with US war ships. Both sides were approaching 
the point of entering the real conflict. As evidence suggested in the past, as soon as Iran 
was close to crossing this red line it diverted toward reconciliation. Economic authorities 
from Tehran also admitted that international sanctions were bringing serious economic 
consequences. Iranian oil sale has fallen from almost 4 million to less than 2 million bar-
rels a day. 
 During his presidential mandates, Ahmedinejad tried to play visible diplomatic 
role by attending every annual session of the UN General Assembly and addressing dif-
ferent multilateral forums with tough messages. His team negotiated within framework of 
5+1 without closing increasing gap between Iran and the international community. In the 
course of his second presidential mandate, he tried to reach some diplomatic breakthrough 
bypassing negotiating framework of 5+1 by using bilateral or trilateral links with Japan, 
Turkey or Brazil. Ahmedinejad signed Teheran declaration with Brazilian President Luiz 
Inacio Lula and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2010 as a compromise 
offer that was not acceptable to the US.  
 At the end of his mission, Ahmedinejad was increasingly marginalized by the 
supreme leader Ali Khamenei. In his double road approach, Khamenei slowly opened an 
opportunity for yet another foreign policy shift. Ahmedinejad was left alone and he slight-
ly changed his rhetoric and offered reconciliatory messages. In his speech at the Summit 
of the Nonaligned Movement in Tehran in 2012, he sounded more like a pacifist than a 
conservative politician. Iranian more aggressive foreign policy actually ended before he 
completed his second term.
Towards Dialogue II
President Hassan Rouhani’s new cabinet brought back some reformist faces from the 
Khatami administrations from 1997 to 2005. The new foreign minister, Mohammad Javad 
Zarif, was Iran’s UN ambassador in the later years of Khatami’s presidency. Massoumeh 
Ebtekar, one of Khatami’s vice presidents and the first woman to hold such office in 
Iran, returns as vice president responsible for the environment. With new faces, Rouhani 
brought back the old reformist foreign policy. As stated, Rouhani wanted to promote Ira-
nian openness, build new confidence and decrease sanctions. Actually, he wanted quick 
diplomatic results. In this regard, he went much further or he was allowed to go further 
than ex reformist president Khatami by having direct phone discussion with president 
Obama, the first such dialogue after Islamic revolution. His foreign minister Zarifi has 
been in regular bilateral meetings with the US State Secretary Kerry in a very relaxed 
diplomatic atmosphere. 
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 These diplomatic moves were not allowed to Khatami’s cabinet members, at least 
not that fast or that often. Rouhani was politically appropriate, trustworthy and most 
knowledgeable presidential candidate from within Khamenei circles (Ex SNSC Secre-
tary). There are arguments that seeds for new moderate presidency in 2013 were also 
planted during Khatami presidency. Rouhani’s reconciliatory messages as nuclear negoti-
ator from 2003-2005 were not forgotten by the international community and key negotiat-
ing countries. This presidency to come was additionally cultivated during intellectual and 
surprisingly open debate for Iranian standards on the character of Iranian foreign policy 
in 2006 and 2008. In his article in Iranian Foreign Policy Journal, Rouhani asked either 
we wanted Iran to scare the region and the world or we need to build friendly relations. 
He concluded that between Islamic Republic and Islamic Revolution he chose Islamic 
Republic (Rouhani, 2006 and 2008). 
 It is not by surprise that on the opposite line was the Iranian president Ahmedine-
jad himself. The latter argued that reformists were traitors. As reported by Hemayat web 
site on March 10, 2008, Ahmedinejad was quoted as saying that those people were asking 
the approval from the US government for Iranian progress. All foreign embassies and ob-
servers noted strong rhetoric difference in the Iranian political culture and foreign policy 
discourse. 
 American policy and advisors were also sending positive signals in this regard. If 
he wants any progress in the Middle East, president Obama needs to open dialogue with 
Iran, suggested Gary Sick, prominent university professor and adviser of three US presi-
dents, Ford, Carter and Regan on CNN on November 16, 2012. Best seller author Stephen 
Kinzer (2010) argued in his book Reset that America had interest to open dialog with Iran 
prior to this negotiation round. Iran that does not feel any threat may reach compromise on 
its nuclear program, open up energy market to US companies, stabilize Iraq and Afghan-
istan, and improve fight against terrorism, particularly Al-Qaida. Then, Limbert (2008) 
gave 15 recommendations to Obama administration to succeed in dialogue with Iran. His 
conclusion was that negotiation between two sides, no matter how hard and difficult, was 
probably better then continues violent relations. 
 In his first press conference as president in August 2013, Rouhani stated: “we seek 
a win-win game and this is possible… We are prepared to enter serious and meaningful 
negotiations with determination and without wasting time, and if our opposing party is 
equally ready, I am confident that the concerns of both sides will be allayed through 
dialogue.” This rhetoric has been followed by fresh round of multilateral negotiations 
within the group of P 5+1. In November 2013, two sides already signed Technical agree-
ment and agreed to continue negotiation to reach comprehensive deal in 2014. Under 
this Technical agreement, Iranian side agreed to stop 20% enrichment of Uranium started 
by Ahmedinejad in 2010 and close its Plutonium facility in Arak. From the other side, 5 
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billion of frozen Iranian financial recourses have been released and other minor sanctions 
were removed. In the meantime, several new rounds of talks have been held in Vienna, 
including bilateral talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Zarifi and US Secretary Kerry. 
Negotiators aimed to find an exceedingly complex and lasting deal limiting Iran’s atomic 
activities in exchange for a lifting of sanctions. 
 The latest foreign policy shift might help the supreme leader Khamenei to improve 
his standing with increasing and disappointed Iranian population that belongs to reformist 
or pragmatic constituency by bringing Reformist back on the main course after political 
turmoil in 2009. However, some recent events indicated that Khamenei’s support may be 
waning as reflected through increased criticism from the right wing individuals. Iranian 
Parliament also rejected Rouhani’s nominations for vacant ministry positions on several 
occasion. These controlled attacks against Rouhani may be explained by several reasons. 
As suggested by analysts, Ali Khamenei will not appear to betray his base of support from 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Then, he may attempt to increase bargaining 
power of Rouhani abroad by criticizing him at home. Third, most probable and most con-
sistent, Khamenei may be building an alternative foreign policy option as he did on two 
other occasions with Khatami and Ahmedinejad already. 
 According to the latest negotiation round between Iranian and 5+1 delegations on 
November 22-24, 2014, new deadline has been extended to March 1, 2015 for new techni-
cal agreement and July 1, 2015 for final agreement. Iran’s supreme leader gave his indirect 
approval for a continuation of talks over its disputed nuclear program on November 25, 
2014. He has been quoted as saying: “on the nuclear issue, the United States and European 
colonialist countries gathered and applied their entire efforts to bring the Islamic Republic 
to its knees but they could not and they will not.” Vice chairman of parliament, Moham-
mad Hassan Aboutorabifard, said the U.S. is not trustworthy since Washington “sacri-
fices” its national interests for Israel, but he still voiced support for further nuclear talks. 
In an address to the nation, the President Rouhani said that the extension was a victory, 
adding negotiations will lead to a deal, “sooner or later.” In this regard, we have yet to see 
what final approach would be taken by Ali Khamenei. Will this latest diplomatic break-
through of partial nuclear compromise from November 2013 go all the way forward? As 
always, Iranian supreme leader has kept all options available by taking into consideration 
Iranian national interest. Political experience and evidence from the past also suggested 
that as soon as Iran arrives close to any big deal, cordial relations or opening of the coun-
try, it will divert in the opposite direction.    
Conclusion
It is evident that Iran is preoccupied with its security and continuation of their state’s 
leadership existence. In order to ensure its survival, it will seek to maximize its negotia-
tion power relative to others. As evidence suggested, international law and international 
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institutions did not constrain or influence Iranian behavior to the extent that they blindly 
follow. In this regard, there is no difference with the Iranian foreign policy which is ex-
tension of its internal policy. 
 Iran has been using its energy wealth and leverage to strengthen his regional in-
fluence with more vulnerable neighbors. It has also used the stature to complicate U.S. 
interests (Carlos Pascual and Evie Zambetakis, 2010). In this regard, it clearly reflects the 
realist point of view. However, Iranian decision makers seem to be pragmatic as well in 
terms of not crossing self declared red lines. As presented in the paper, they never decided 
to accumulate enriched Uranium of 20% to 200kg, thus avoiding breaking the trust com-
pletely or giving strong evidence of nuclear military program.   
 This historical attitude of last 11 years has been fluid between two red lines re-
flecting Iranian double track approach. As presented in the paper, Iranian establishment 
moved between two opposing lines all the time. As soon as Iran reached one (dialogue, 
compromise, cordial relations with the West), it diverted towards animosity and instability 
almost as a rule. 
 This has been the transitional phase from Khatami to Ahmedinejad presidency. On 
the other side, as soon as it reached the other red line (instability, isolation and possible 
war with the United States), it diverted again, this time towards dialogue, compromise or 
cordial relations. This has been the transitional phase from Ahmedinejad to Rouhani pres-
idency. As Iran followed its national interest at the time, it also reflected the realist point 
rather than any other understanding of international relations behavior. Thus, Donette 
(2010) spoke about generational struggle in her book US Foreign Policy and Iran. 
 It has been evident that all negotiating positions and all shifts in Iranian foreign 
relations have been supervised by the supreme leader. And this has been consistent policy 
throughout three phases that have been examined. Although the decision to end the sus-
pension of Uranium enrichment in 2005 was probably taken before Ahmadinejad, Aya-
tollah Ali Khamenei made clear before the election that the nuclear issue was a national, 
not a presidential matter (Leonard, 2005). After the latest negotiating round in November 
this year, the New York Times reported that Iranian current foreign minister “often warned 
that the final decision would be in the hands of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khame-
nei.”
 
 Is comprehensive nuclear deal between Iran and the West possible? The supreme 
leader was initially restraining public criticism of Rouhani through his public support for 
the nuclear negotiations at the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014. Khamenei gave him a 
chance, tested his loyalty and checked US / EU approach and readiness for compromise. 
To some extent, he is still checking deal options as negotiating deadline has been extended 
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to mid of 2015. Other options have been kept alive as controlled attacks from the con-
servative cycles continued. American analysts believe that any serious attempt to renew 
Iranian American relations would be political earthquake in Iran, would create political 
fractions of losers and winners where losers would refuse to accept change of existing 
status quo (David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jarrold D. Greem, Charlotte 
Lynch, F.Wehrey, 2010). 
 Therefore, for any nuclear deal to be agreed on Iranian side, it is not sufficient that 
the negotiating delegation only consent. More importantly, it is conservative cycles in 
general and supreme leader in particular that has the final say. Rouhani has complex posi-
tion in this regard. He has to reach as better deal as possible. At the same time, he is sup-
posed to convince extreme circles, including supreme leader, that there is no alternative 
to Iranian course of opening. Failure to deal with the international community is failure 
to his reformist policy. Similar stand could be expected from the US side. As reported by 
US media, “Kerry’s position was complicated by the Republican midterm election victo-
ry and the fear of feeding the narrative that Mr. Obama was a weakened president.” This 
brings us to the final conclusion that reaching final deal between Iran and the West next 
year depends on so many centers of power and so many opposing views.  
 Success in ongoing negotiations could resolve one of the most intractable geopo-
litical problems in the region. From the other side, the failure could divert Iran from dialog 
to tension yet again. If there is no deal between Iran and the international community next 
year, the United States will face a clear choice. On one side, US will be in position of 
tolerating the Iranian nuclear ambition. On the other, it may reapply continued diplomatic 
and economic pressure. On the extreme side, as suggested by US authorities, military 
means have not been excluded. 
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